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Abstract
EWA Lite is a one-parameter theory of learning in normal-form games. It
approximates the free parameters in an earlier model (EWA) with functions
of experience. The theory is tested on seven dierent games and compared to
other learning and equilibrium theories. Either EWA Lite or parameterized
EWA predict best, but one kind of reinforcement learning predicts well in
games with mixed-strategy equilibrium. Belief learning models t worst. The
economic value of theories is measured by how much more subjects would have
earned if they followed theory recommendations. EWA Lite and EWA add
the most economic value in every game but one.

This paper should not be circulated or quoted without permission. Thanks to participants in the
Southern Economics Association meetings (December, 2000), the Wharton School Decision Processes
Workshop, and C. Monica Capra for comments.
\In nature hybrid species are usually sterile, but in science the reverse is
true"{ Francis Crick (1988, p. 150)
The power of equilibrium models comes from their ability to produce precise pre-
dictions using only the structure of a game and some assumptions about rationality.
Statistical models of learning should strive to be almost as parsimonious and precise,
while also predicting the time path of actual observations more accurately than equilib-
rium theories do. Most learning models do this by specifying a formula for predicting
future choices from past experiences (often at the population level), using one or more
free parameters which are typically estimated from data. This paper describes a theory
of learning in decisions and games called EWA Lite, with only one parameter. EWA
Lite predicts the time path of individual behavior in any normal-form game (given initial
conditions) including new games in which behavior has never been observed.
The key innovation in EWA Lite is the replacement of parameter values with func-
tions of players' experience, which can vary across games, individuals, and time periods.
Replacing parameters with functions kills two birds with one stone. The ¯rst bird is
explaining why estimated model parameter values vary signi¯cantly across games (as
earlier research showed). The functions in EWA Lite reproduce these cross-game dif-
ferences endogeneously, as a function of the interaction between experience and game
structure. The second \bird" is parsimony. By replacing parameters with functions, in
EWA Lite only one free parameter needs to be estimated or ¯xed a priori. (The param-
eter captures sensitivity of players to di®erences in numerical ratings of strategies; it is
probably impossible to ¯t data, and hence have a zero-parameter theory, without it.1)
There are other one-parameter theories but they do not predict as well across games as
EWA Lite does.
EWA Lite is used to ¯t and predict data from seven experimental data sets, and is
compared to general versions of belief and reinforcement learning, and quantal response
equilibrium. In out-of-sample forecasting, either EWA Lite or its parameterized precur-
sor, EWA, tend to predict best, although a new version of reinforcement predicts as well
in some cross-game forecasting. We also introduce a new criterion for judging usefulness
1If the goal is to predict the most likely choice, EWA Lite can be reduced to a zero-parameter theory
by setting the experience weight N (0) to 0 (see below).
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of theories{ economic value. The economic value of a theory is measured by how well
model forecasts of behavior of other players would improve a player's pro¯tability of best
responses to those forecasts were substituted for the player's actual choices. EWA and
EWA Lite have the highest economic value in 5 to 7 (depending on what parameters
were used to generate forecasts) of the 7 games we study.
While EWA Lite is rather narrowly focused to explain learning in normal-form games,
sensible extensions of it can be applied to ¯eld settings such as evolution of economic
institutions (e.g., internet auctions or pricing), investors and policymakers learning about
equity market °uctuations or macroeconomic phenomena, and consumer choice. A vari-
ant of the EWA theory is used by Teck-Hua Ho and Juin-Kuan Chong (1999) to ¯t and
predict 130,000 product choices by consumers.2 Readers who are interested in learning in
¯eld settings should be interested in how subjects learn in experimental games because
understanding learning in the lab will surely help us understand learning in the ¯eld.
1 EWA learning and its limitations
In earlier work we proposed a model of learning called experience-weighted attraction
(EWA) theory (Colin Camerer and Ho 1998, 1999). Learning in EWA is characterized
by changes in (unobserved) attractions based on experience. EWA was designed to be a
gene-splice or hybrid of two models, reinforcement and belief learning, which have been
used to study learning in games. The EWA model wraps a parametric skin around both
of those theories, which are historically-interesting special cases on the boundary of the
parameter space.
Attractions determine the probabilities of choosing di®erent strategies through a lo-
gistic response function. For player i, there are mi strategies (indexed by j) which have
initial attractions denoted Aji (0) (either estimated as free parameters from the data,
speci¯ed by some theory of initial conditions, or \burned in" using the ¯rst period data).
Denote i's j'th strategy by sji , chosen strategies by i and other players (denoted ¡i)
2Their theory uses 80% fewer parameters than the leading theory used in marketing and predicts
20% better.
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by si(t) and s¡i(t), and player i's payo®s by ¼i(s
j
i ; s¡i(t)). De¯ne an indicator function
I(x;y) to be zero if x6= y and one if x = y. The EWA attraction updating equation is3
Aji(t) =
Á ¢N(t¡ 1) ¢Aji(t¡ 1) + [±+ (1¡ ±) ¢ I(sji ; si(t))] ¢¼i(sji ; s¡i(t))
N(t¡ 1) ¢ Á ¢ (1¡·) + 1 (1.1)
and the experience weight is updated according to N(t) = N(t¡ 1) ¢Á(1¡ ·) + 1.
The parameter ± is the weight placed on foregone payo®s. It presumably is a®ected
by imagination (in psychological terms, the strength of counterfactual simulation) and
reliability of information about foregone payo®s (Dana Heller and Rajiv Sarin, 2000).
The parameter Á re°ects decay of previous attractions due to forgetting or to deliberate
ignorance of old experience when the learning environment is changing. The parameter ·
controls the rate at which attractions grow. When · = 0 attractions are weighted averages
of reinforcements and decayed lagged attractions; when · = 1 attractions cumulate.
The growth rate of attractions is important because in the logit model the di®erence in
attractions determines the spread of choice probabilities. The initial experience weight
N(0) is like a strength of prior beliefs and is estimated using data. Since it usually plays
a minor role in predicting learning, we restrict N(0) = 1 in our speci¯cation of EWA
Lite.4
3This updating equation assumes that subjects know the payo®s of strategies that were not chosen. In
Camerer, Ho, and Xin Wang (1999), we apply EWA model to games where such payo®s are not available
by allowing subjects to learn about them through experience. See Yan Chen and Yuri Khoroshilov (2000)
for a similar extension.
4In earlier work we imposed the restriction N(0) < 1Á¢(1¡·) so that the experience weight, which is
updated according to N (t) = Á ¢ (1¡ ·) ¢N (t¡ 1) + 1, is always increasing. When the inequality binds,
as it often does, N (0) and · are not separately identi¯ ed. We also switched notation in the denominator
(previously we denoted the product Á ¢ (1¡·) by a single variable ½). The notation shift makes the way
in which · controls cumulation versus averaging more transparent.
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A logit response function5 is used to map attractions into probabilities:
Pji (t+ 1) =
e¸¢A
j
i (t)Pmi
k=1 e
¸¢Aki (t)
(1.2)
where ¸ is the response sensitivity.
A key insight from our earlier work is that reinforcement and belief learning ap-
proaches are closely related in an interesting way.6 When ± = 0 the EWA rule is the
same as models in which only chosen strategies are reinforced, originating in studies of
animal learning. When · = 1 the rule is a simpler form of cumulative reinforcement
model studied by Calvin Harley (1981) and Alvin Roth and Ido Erev (1995) (see also
Robert Bush and Frederick Mosteller, 1955; John Cross, 1983; Patrick McAllister, 1991;
Brian Arthur, 1991). When · = 0 the rule is like the averaging reinforcement model of
Roth, Greg Barron, Erev and Robert Slonim (2000).
When ± = 1 and · = 0 the EWA rule is equivalent to belief learning using weighted
¯ctitious play (Fudenberg and Levine, 1998). The EWA rule shows that belief learning
is not fundamentally di®erent than reinforcement. It is a kind of reinforcement in which
unchosen strategies are reinforced as strongly as chosen ones, and attractions are averages.
One way to see the relation of di®erent learning rules is a cube showing con¯gurations
of parameter values (see Figure 1). Each point in the cube is a triple of parameter values
which speci¯es a precise updating equation (leaving aside ¸ and initial conditions). The
cube shows the EWA family of learning rules. Corners and vertices of the EWA cube
correspond to boundary special cases. The corner of the cube with Á = · = 0; ± = 1,
is Cournot best-response dynamics. The corner · = 0;Á = ± = 1, is standard ¯ctitious
play (George Brown, 1951 and Julia Robinson, 1951). The edge connecting these corners,
± = 1; · = 0, is the class of weighted ¯ctitious play rules (e.g., Fudenberg and Levine,
5In previous work (Camerer and Ho, 1998) we compared the logit rule and a power function in which
attractions are exponentiated and normalized P
j
i (t + 1) = (A
j
i(t))
¸=
Pmi
k=1(A
k
i (t))
¸. The logit rule ¯ts
slightly better, depending on how ¯t is evaluated. The denominator of the attraction updating equation
(Á ¢ (1¡·) + 1) divides out when using the power rule, which conserves a degree of freedom and may be
useful for some purposes.
6See also Yin-Wong Cheung and Daniel Friedman, 1997, pp. 54-55; Drew Fudenberg and David
Levine, 1998, pp. 1084-1085; Ed Hopkins, 1999.
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1998). The edges with ± = 0 and · equal to zero or one are averaging and cumulative
choice reinforcement rules.
The EWA cube is a visual aid to show the relations and di®erences among theories.
But EWA is also a bet that psychologically plausible learning rules have parameter values
which are in the interior of the cube rather than on vertices and corners. (That is, as
Francis Crick suggested in the quote that opened this paper, a scienti¯c hybrid may
work better.) Reinforcement theories with ± = 0 ignore foregone payo®s entirely.7 Belief
learning using weighted ¯ctitious play (± = 1) ignores the di®erence between received and
foregone payo®s, which is also unlikely.8 Put di®erently, reinforcement models assume
that received payo®s matter more than foregone payo®s (± < 1) and belief learning says
that foregone payo®s do matter (± > 0). Both intuitions are plausible and EWA includes
both if ± is between zero and one. Intermediate estimated values of ± could result if some
subjects learn according to reinforcement and others according to weighted ¯ctitious play,
but direct tests allowing \latent class" heterogeneity show this is not so (Camerer and
Ho, 1998).
Estimates by ourselves and others (see Camerer, David Hsia, and Ho, 2000) have
shown in 31 data sets that EWA generally predicts (out of sample) more accurately than
the special cases of reinforcement and weighted ¯ctitious play, except in games with
mixed-strategy equilibrium (where all models only improve a little on Nash equilibrium).
However, EWA has been criticized for having too many free parameters. EWA Lite
answers this criticism because it has only one parameter, so it is simpler than most
reinforcement and belief models.
Figure 1 also shows estimated parameter triples from twenty games (see Camerer,
Hsia, and Ho, 2000). Each point corresponds to a di®erent game. If one of the special
case theories is a good approximation to how people generally behave across games, the
parameters will cluster in the corner or vertex corresponding to that theory. In fact,
7This assumption is implausible when foregone payo®s are known, and has been rejected by studies
comparing di®erent information conditions, e.g., Dilip Mookerjhee and Barry Sopher, 1994, and Amnon
Rapoport and Erev, 1998; and John Van Huyck, Raymond Battalio and Frederick Rankin, 1996.
8There is substantial evidence that people underweight opportunity costs compared to out-of-pocket
costs (e.g., Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetsch, and Richard Thaler, 1991). Since the di®erence between
foregone and received payo®s is an opportunity cost (or gain) if it is underweighted then ± < 1.
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parameters tend to be sprinkled around the cube. Estimates from coordination games
usually have high values of ± and ·. Estimates from mixed games tend to have low ± and
· (close to the averaging reinforcement corner with Á close to one).
A second criticism of EWA is that estimated parameter values vary across games (al-
though parametric variation is characteristic of all learning models, e.g., Vincent Craw-
ford, 1995; Cheung and Friedman, 1997). Roth, et al. (2000) note that our earlier work
found \very di®erent parameters in, apparently, very similar constant sum games. Their
[Camerer and Ho's] research leads to the pessimistic conclusion that, at least currently,
it is impossible to predict behavior in a new situation". Their conclusion is too pes-
simistic, because EWA Lite maps games to parameters and makes it possible to predict
new games.
2 EWA Lite
EWA Lite replaces the three central parameters of EWA, Á; ±; · with deterministic func-
tions Ái(t); ±i(t); ·i(t) of player i's experience up to period t. These functions determine
parameter values for each player and period, which are then plugged into the EWA
updating equation to determine attractions. Updated attractions determine choice prob-
abilities according to the logit rule, given a value of ¸. Standard methods for optimizing
¯t given ¸ can then be used to ¯nd which ¸ ¯ts best.
2.1 The change-detector function Ái(t)
The decay rate Á is sometimes interpreted as forgetting, an interpretation carried over
from reinforcement models of animal learning. Certainly forgetting does occur, but the
more important variation in Ái(t) across games is probably a player's perception of how
quickly the learning environment is changing. The function Ái(t) should therefore \detect
change". As in physical change detectors (e.g., security systems or smoke alarms), the
challenge is to detect change when it is really occurring, but not falsely mistake noise
for change too often. The core of the function is a \surprise index", the di®erence
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between the other players' strategies in the window of the last W periods and the average
strategy of others in all previous periods (where W is the minimal support of Nash
equilibria). We specify the function in terms of relative frequencies of strategies, without
using information about how strategies are ordered, so it can be applied to non-ordered
strategies (e.g., rows in a normal-form game). The change-detection function Ái(t) is
Ái(t) = 1¡ :5(
m¡iX
j=1
[
Pt
¿=t¡W+1 I(s
j
¡i ; s¡i(¿ ))
W
¡
Pt
¿=1 I(s
j
¡i; s¡i(¿))
t
]2) (2.1)
The term
Pt
¿=t¡W+1 I (s
j
¡i;s¡i(¿ ))
W
is the j-th element of a vector that simply counts how
often strategy j was played by the others in periods t¡W + 1 to t, and divides by W.
The term
Pt
¿=1
I(sj¡i;s¡i(¿ ))
t
is the relative frequency count of the j-th strategy over all
t periods. 9 To measure change, we take the di®erences in corresponding elements of
the two frequency vectors, square them, and sum over strategies. Since the maximum
di®erence is two, the function is normalized by dividing the sum of squared di®erences
by two, and subtracting the normalized ¯gure from one. When recent observations of
what others have done deviate a lot from all previous observations, the deviations in
strategy frequencies will be high and Á will be low. When recent observations are like
old observations, Á will be high.
The key to modeling Á is keeping it close to one unless there is an unmistakably
persistent change in what others are doing. It is dangerous to let Á become too low
because doing so erases everything that has been learned, by giving a low weight to
previous attractions which summarize previous experience. The Ái(t) function dips lowest
in the extreme case in which one strategy is played until t¡1, and then a new strategy is
played. Then Ái(t) is 2t¡1t2 . This expression declines gracefully toward zero as the string
of identical choices up to period t grows longer. (For t=2, 3, and 10 the Ái(t) values are
.75, .56, and .19.) This makes sense because after more identical choices in a row a new
choice is a bigger surprise. A lower Á puts a higher decay on old experience. Another
interesting special case is when di®erent strategies have been played in every period up
to t¡ 1, and another di®erent strategy is played in period t. (This is often true in games
9In the case of games with multiple players, frequency count of the relevant aggregate statistics is
used. For example, in median action game, frequency count of the median strategy by all other players
in each period is used.
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with large strategy spaces, such as p-beauty contests, when order of strategies is not
used.) Then Ái(t) = :5 + 12t , which starts at :75 and asymptotes at :5 as t increases.
So far we have neglected an important detail: What's W? W is the smallest support
of all the Nash equilibria (the number of strategies played with positive probability).
In games with a pure strategy equilibrium, W = 1. In games with mixed equilibria
W is larger than one. In these games, a certain amount of period to period change is
expected. The number of strategies with positive probability, W, tells us roughly \how
much" variation to expect, and hence, how many previous observations to average to
smooth perceived change.
2.2 Responsiveness ±i(t)
The parameter ± is the weight on foregone payo®s. We tried several speci¯cations10 and
settled on the following: ±i(t) = Ái(t)=W.
The speci¯cation ± = Á
W
is appealing for three reasons. First, tying ± to the change
measure Á recognizes the fact that best-responding to foregone payo®s is a good strategy
when the environment is stable, so that ± should be near one when Á is near one. But
10We tried obvious routes like setting ± = 1 (as in belief learning models). This speci¯cation does
poorly in mixed games in which estimated ±s are close to zero. We also explored speci¯cations which used
the person's own history of responses to judge whether she is responsive to foregone payo®s or not and
customize di®erent ± values for each player. Suppose a player moves toward a worse response after period
t and anticipate earning less from their strategy in t+ 1, given what the other player did last time, than
if they had simply repeated their previous choice (i.e., ¼i(si(t+ 1); s¡i(t)) < ¼i(si(t);s¡i(t)))). When
this happens we give the player a score of 0 in period t + 1 (i.e., they were not responsive to foregone
payo®s in that period). If the player moves toward a (weakly) better response, or repeats her choice
when it is the ex post best response, she gets a responsiveness score of 1. The player's ± is the average
of these 0 and 1 scores over all previous periods. This approach uses the person's own behavior to
identify their \type", a la \revealed preference" in consumer theory. This approach does capture an
important cross-game regularity, which is that players are more responsive in games with pure equilibria
than in games with mixed equilibria so ± 's are lower in mixed games. (When there are mixed equilibria
players often do not best-respond to the last choice by their opponent, which leads to low values of ±.)
However, this responsiveness-indexing approach just did not ¯t that well. Without stronger intuitions,
axiomatic underpinnings, or earlier research to guide us, we opted for the simpler ± = Á=W speci¯ cation.
Researchers looking for ways to improve on EWA Lite should attack the ± speci¯ cation ¯rst.
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when Á is low, the strategic environment is changing and information about past foregone
payo®s is not likely to be a good guide to future choices. But then why should received
payo®s be reinforced relatively more strongly than foregone payo®s (by a weight of one
rather than low ±) when Á is low? There are two reasons. One is essentially econometric:
When Á is low, then attractions from period t¡ 1 are largely erased during the updating
before period t. Reinforcing the chosen strategy from period t payo® with a weight of
one partially \restores" information about what players are likely to do (since the erased
lagged attractions and the previous choice which is strongly reinforced are likely to be
correlated). The second reason is behavioral: Reinforcing chosen strategies more strongly
than unchosen ones in low-Á environments models behavior of players who are especially
likely to repeat what they did, like a \freezing" response to danger or \status quo bias",
when the environment is changing.11
The second reason for the ± speci¯cation is that W is only greater than one in games
which only have mixed equilibria. Why would a player want to have a lower ± (since
± = Á
W
) in these games? A procedurally rational player may suspect that others are
sophisticated and can anticipate, to some extent, what she will do by guessing how
she learns. In a competitive game with a mixed equilibrium, being too responsive to
foregone payo®s makes a player's choices too predictable, and makes her vulnerable to
exploitation. Consider constant-sum games like matching pennies. If a player wins, the
foregone payo®s from other strategies are zero so the value of ± makes no di®erence since
it multiplied by the loss payo® (which is scaled to zero). But if she loses, then having
a high ± implies you will switch to the (ex post) winning strategy, which makes you
predictable and exploitable. If ± is low, however, then if you lose it is di±cult to know
11Freezing is a response to danger which is nearly universal across species (including humans). This
is presumably an adaptive response when predators are better at detecting movement than recognizing
prey. Such a deep-seated response may lurk in the \old" or \animal" part of the human brain (the limbic
system, which processes emotion and communicates with the prefrontal cortex that controls action; see
Joseph LeDoux, 1996). Status quo bias refers to an exaggerated preference for the choice one has made
in the past, even if the choice is assigned randomly (e.g., William Samuelson and Richard Zeckhauser,
1988; Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1991). Experiments show that status quo bias is stronger when
there are more sensible options available to switch to (loosely corresponding to W ). This number-of-
option e®ect can be captured in a model like ours by putting more reinforcement on the previous, status
quo, choice, and putting reinforcement on alternative strategies which declines with W , precisely as in
our model.
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where you will switch to, which is actually a strategic advantage (and also characteristic
of the data).
Third, and most decisively, the speci¯cation ±i(t) = Ái(t)=W simply ¯ts and predicts
better than many others we tried (and than speci¯cations in familiar reinforcement and
belief models). The key reason is that in estimates from many games (see Camerer, Hsia,
and Ho, 2000), ±^ is generally between .5 and 1 in games with pure-strategy equilibria
but is much lower (often zero) in games with mixed equilibria. Dividing Á by W pushes
± in the right direction{ pushing it close to zero in games with mixed equilibrium{ and
enabling the ±i(t) function to predict better across games than a ¯xed cross-game estimate
of ± in the EWA model or in the prominent special cases.
2.3 The exploitation parameter ·i(t)
The parameter · controls the growth rate of attractions. When · = 0 attractions are
weighted averages of lagged attractions and (±¡weighted) payo®s, so (if initial attractions
are scaled to payo®s) the attractions are bounded by payo®s. If · = 0 attractions cannot
grow too far apart. Fixing ¸ across periods, this means it is di±cult to predict very sharp
convergence in later periods (as we sometimes see in the lab). That's because using the
logit probability function, the degree of sharpness or convergence in probability (i.e., the
di®erence between the highest and lowest choice probabilities) depends only on the di®er-
ence in attractions, which is multiplied by sensitivity parameter .¸ When attractions are
bounded by payo®s, attractions cannot grow too far apart so the ¸¡weighted di®erences
cannot be too large. (This could be remedied by choosing a higher ¸ but that predicts
behavior which is sharp early one, contrary to observations.) When · = 1, however,
attractions are (decayed) cumulations of previous (weighted) payo®s. Then attractions
can grow larger and larger{ they can be multiples of payo®s{ and consequently, choice
probabilities can grow further apart.
Psychologically, · can be interpreted as the extent to which players \explore" by
choosing di®erent strategies, relative to how quickly they \exploit" what they have
learned by switching to a constant choice of the strategy which has performed the best
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in the past.12. Players with low · are constantly exploring{ they just keep track of aver-
age (±-weighted) payo®s. When players \exploit" they commit to a strategy, even if its
average previous payo® is not much larger than the average payo®s of other strategies.
One way to model this is to let · move toward one as players shift toward exploiting
what they have learned. If payo®s are positive, a higher · means players are basically
rewarding a strategy they choose a lot, simply for being chosen (assuming ± < 1). This
is one way of characterizing lock-in empirically.
This line of argument suggests using variation in how frequently a player uses di®erent
strategies to track when they explore and when they exploit. We use the player's past
behavior to tell us whether they explore or exploit and when they switch. The degree of
exploration versus exploitation can be measured by the spread in probability of a player's
observed choices. A standard measure of spread is the Gini coe±cient, typically used to
measure income inequality. We use the Gini coe±cient too, where choice proportion is
akin to income: When a player is exploring, the probabilistic `income' will be spread to
many strategies, and the Gini will be low. When a player has locked into one strategy,
all her probability is allocated to that one and the Gini will be high (close to one).13
To calculate the Gini coe±cient for subject i, ¯rst rank strategies from most-probable
to least-probable (using observed choice frequencies). Denote the rank-ordered choice
proportions of these strategies by f (1)i (t) to f
(mi)
i (t). Then plot a cumulative probability
distribution which measures the total probability of the strategies used as frequently as
j or less frequently, Ci(j;t) =
Pj
k=1 f
(k)
i (t). This calculation gives j points; use linear
interpolation to create a piecewise-linear function connecting the points. The Gini coef-
¯cient is then the area between the identity line and the interpolated function passing
through the Ci(j; t) points, normalized so that Gini coe±cients range from zero (when
all strategies are played equally often) to 1 (when one strategy is played all the time).
The normalized Gini coe±cient on strategy frequencies is then:
12The exploration- exploitation tradeo® is studied formally in the multi-armed bandit literature (John
Gittins, 1989), and also of interest to computer scientists designing machines to learn, see Richard Sutton
and Andrew Barto, 1998
13We also tried the sum of squared probabilities, a Her¯ndahl index often used to measure industrial
concentration. This number is usually too low to ¯t well.
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·i(t) = 1¡ 2 ¢ f
miX
k=1
f (k)i (t) ¢
mi ¡ k
mi¡ 1g (2.2)
where f ki (t) are ranked from the lowest to the highest.
14 This · function re°ects the
following thought process: A player tracks her actual choice frequencies. When the
spread is low, the player is still exploring and wants to keep attractions from cumulating,
so she chooses a low · so that attractions continue to be averages. However, as she
learns and chooses one strategy more often, she begins to exploit what she has learned.
Exploitation requires a way of guaranteeing that the most frequently-chosen strategies
get chosen more and more often. One way to do this is to let attractions cumulate, so that
frequently-chosen strategy attractions will grow larger and larger simply because they are
chosen more often (assuming ± < 1). Letting · be a function of strategy \concentration"
is one way to do this.
Using cumulation to capture exploitation of high-payo® strategies is related to other
ideas. One may be familiar to economists{ Polya urns, which have been used to explain
economies from increasing returns (Arthur, 1989) A Polya urn starts with a distribution
of balls (e.g., some red and some black). When a red ball is drawn, it is replaced, along
with another red ball. Draws therefore generate a payo® and increase the chance that the
same payo® will occur again. This is a simple model of increasing returns or learning-by-
doing (drawing a red makes red more likely) with interesting mathematical properties.
The Gini coe±cient captures a similar process. If one strategy is chosen often that
leads to large ·, which means that strategy payo®s cumulate. When ± < 1 (as is common),
cumulation favors chosen strategies; so strategies which are chosen often get chosen more
often in the future, as in the Polya urn.
14For instance, in the median action game, suppose the relative choice frequencies for player i up to
period t for actions 1-7 are 0, .0, .2, .4, .3, .0, and .1 respectively. Then we have f
(1)
i (t) = f
(2)
i (t) =
f
(3)
i (t) = 0:0, f
(4)
i (t) = 0:1, f
(5)
i (t) = 0:2, f
(6)
i (t) = 0:3, and f
(7)
i (t) = 0:4. Consequently, we have:
·i(t) = 1¡ 2 ¢ f0 + 0 + 0 + 0:1 ¢ 7¡47¡1 + 0:2 ¢ 7¡57¡1 + 0:3 ¢ 7¡67¡1 + 0g, which is 23 .
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2.4 Interpretation
The EWA Lite parameter functions are not grounded in principles familiar to game
theorists. But the principles which are familiar, especially Bayesian updating, lead to
models which EWA Lite strives (successfully) to outpredict. Any alternative model is
necessarily di®erent.
However, the EWA Lite parameter functions can be thought of as procedurally ratio-
nal (in Herbert Simon's language) because they are precise and are designed to accomplish
a speci¯c goal: Namely, to predict and perform well in a wide range of games. One can
imagine a truly optimal learning rule which maximizes expected payo®s across a wide
range of games. However, we conjecture that such a rule would look more like EWA Lite
than like other familiar rules. For example, ¯ctitious play has good long-run properties
in some environments but will not respond rapidly enough to changes in an environment.
Cournot best-response changes too quickly in games with mixed equilibria. Weighted
¯ctitious play is °exible enough to do well in both stationary environments and mixed
games, but how does one pick the right weights? EWA Lite does so automatically based
on what is observed. Rather than derive a globally rational approach from axioms, our
approach is like work in machine learning, which tries to develop robust heuristic al-
gorithms which learn e®ectively in a wide variety of low-information environments (see
Sutton and Barto 1998). Good learning rules are not provably optimal but perform
well on tricky test cases and lifelike problems like those which good computerized robots
could perform (navigating around obstacles, hill-climbing on rugged landscapes, di±cult
pattern recognition, and so forth).
EWA Lite has three advantages. It is easy to use because it has only one free param-
eter to be estimated (¸ ).15 The use of simple ¯ctitious play and reinforcement theories
in empirical analysis are often justi¯ed on the grounds of parsimony and how easily they
15It is conceivable that ¸ could also be speci¯ed ex ante but doing so will be di±cult. The problem is
that comparing values across games requires a standard unit of payo®s (we use dollars). However, changes
in experimental currency which keep money earnings constant are likely to produce di®erent behavior and
require di®erent values of ¸ (see Richard McKelvey, Thomas Palfrey, and Roberto Weber, forthcoming).
Furthermore, the model implicitly assumes that di®erences in strategy attraction calibrated in money
terms drive di®erences in choice probability but other framing e®ects may matter. For example, if players
are sensitive to percentage di®erences in payo®s rather than absolute di®erences, then using a ¯xed ¸
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can be implemented. By those criteria, EWA Lite should be at least as attractive and
will usually ¯t as well or better.
A second advantage is that parameters in EWA Lite naturally vary across time and
people (as well as across games). In principle this might capture individual di®erences if
they arise from experience. For example, some experiments on games with mixed-strategy
equilibria allow subjects to explicitly choose randomized strategies (see Camerer, 2001,
chapter 2). In these experiments, some subjects play pure strategies and some play
mixtures. This di®erence in individual play is easily expressed by our ·i(t) function,
which will tend toward one for purists and toward zero for mixers.
Because parameters can vary across time, a third advantage is that EWA Lite can
mimic a very reduced form of \rule learning". Recall that di®erent EWA parameter
con¯gurations correspond to specialized rules (such as cumulative choice reinforcement,
¯ctitious play, or Cournot best-response dynamics). If parameters change throughout the
game, those changes are like rule switching or rule learning, in which the rules players use
change due to experience (as in Dale Stahl, 1996, 1999, forthcoming, and Tim Salmon,
1999). For example, if Á rises over time from 0 to 1, players are e®ectively switching from
Cournot-type dynamics to ¯ctitious play. If ± rises from 0 to 1, players are switching
from reinforcement to belief learning. Rule learning is, of course, more general than the
range of learning permissible in EWA Lite, and is an important competitor among those
models which have many more parameters.
One way to think about EWA Lite is that it repairs weaknesses in reinforcement and
belief learning and therefore proves more robust across games. Reinforcement learning
falls short on two grounds: It assumes incorrectly that players only use information about
the payo®s they received, even when they know foregone payo®s. Choice reinforcement
sometimes underpredicts the rate of learning in games with large strategy spaces in which
players initially choose strategies in one part of the space, then switch to strategies in an
entirely di®erent part of the space (Camerer and Ho, 1998; and see below for continental
across games will not explain what they choose (they will act like they use a lower ¸ when a positive
constant is added to payo®s). John Pratt, David Wise, and Zeckhauser (1979) show this e®ect using
¯eld data on price dispersion across product categories. If all these e®ects are eventually understood a
theory of how ¸ varies across games could be developed but such a goal is ambitious and beyond the
scope of this paper.
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divide games) because strategies which are chosen late in the game are rarely picked early
on so they are not reinforced. Reinforcement also underpredicts movement in n-player
games where most earn no pro¯ts in a period and get no reinforcement (such as auctions
or \winner-take-all" labor tournaments). This is evident below in travellers' dilemma
games.16
Belief learning has a di®erent weakness. Belief models learn quickly in games with
shifting support and many zero-payo® players, but give no ready explanation for why the
decay rates on previous observations di®er across games. For example, old observations
are decayed more rapidly in the continental divide and beauty contest games than in
games with mixed equilibria and patent race games. Confronted with a brand new game,
belief learning theories have no built-in way of guessing whether Cournot-like responsive
dynamics or standard ¯ctitious play (Á = 1) will predict best. EWA Lite can do better
by predicting variation in Á as a function of initial conditions and game structure.
In the form we use, the EWA Lite model does require information about initial condi-
tions (i.e, relative frequencies of ¯rst-period play) and information about the structure of
the game{ namely, the minimal support of Nash equilibria (W). As a practical matter,
pinning downW boils down to guessing whether a game has a pure-strategy equilibrium,
and whether it is symmetric or not, or has only mixed equilibria (and if so, how many
strategies are used in the mixture). Even in ¯eld applications where the game is not
controlled as in the lab, guessing whether W is one or much larger is probably not hard
to do.
Finally, EWA Lite can be interpreted as a procedurally rational learning rule which
attempts to adapt the nature of learning to features of the environment. A good example
is the decay parameter Á. In games where other players are learning slowly, and outcomes
are noisy (e.g., games with mixed equilibria), a good learning rule should have a value
of Á close to one so that a large sample of past experience is taken. On the other hand,
16Of course, reinforcement learning can be speeded up if players reinforce payo®s relative to an aspi-
ration level. But specifying aspiration levels requires two parameters{ an initial apiration level and an
adjustment rate. EWA generates aspiration-based reinforcement with no extra parameters: Strategies
only increase in probability (holding their lagged attractions constant) if their ±¡weighted payo®s are
above the average ±¡weighted payo®. Thus, the ±-weighted payo® is is an aspiration level, which evolves
endogeneously over time without requiring any free parameters.
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in games where learning is rapid, a player should use a low value of Á so that the e®ects
of stale experiences are quickly discarded. An example is dominance-solvable p-beauty
contests (Camerer, Ho and Chong, 2000). In our view, it is a modeling error to use the
same value of Á for mixed games and for dominance-solvable games. The challenge in
EWA Lite, however, is to create a \change-detection" function which allows Á to be low
or high depending on the data a player sees.
3 EWA Lite predictions within and across seven games
In this section we compare in-sample ¯t and out-of-sample predictive accuracy of di®erent
learning models when parameters are freely estimated, and check whether EWA Lite
functions can produce game-speci¯c parameters similar to estimated values. We use
seven games: Games with unique mixed strategy equilibrium (Mookerjhee and Sopher,
1997); R&D patent race games (Rapoport and Wilfred Amaldoss, 2000); a median-action
order statistic coordination game with several players (Van Huyck, Battalio, and Richard
Beil, 1990); a continental-divide coordination game, in which convergence behavior is
extremely sensitive to initial conditions (Van Huyck, Joseph Cook, and Battalio, 1997);
a coordination game about entry to two markets of di®erent sizes (Amaldoss and Ho,
2001); dominance-solvable p-beauty contests (Ho, Camerer, and Keith Weigelt, 1998);
and a traveler dilemma game (Monica Capra, Jacob Goeree, Rosario Gomez and Charles
Holt, 1999). Table 1 summarizes features of these games and the data. Three of the
games are described in detail below.17 Since one of our goals is to see whether EWA
Lite can explain cross-game variation in model parameters, we sample di®erent classes of
games. Sampling widely is also a good way to test robustness of any model of learning
17The other four games are: Mixed-equilibrium games studied by Mookerjhee and Sopher (1997)
which have four or six strategies, one of which is weakly-dominated; the nine-player median-action
game studied by Van Huyck et al. (1990), in which players choose integer strategies 1-7 and earn
payo®s increasing linearly in the group median and decreasing linearly in the squared deviation from the
median; dominance-solvable p-beauty contest games in which players choose numbers from 0 to 100 and
the player closest to p times the average earns a ¯xed prize (for p equal to .7 or .9); and a coordination
game in which n players simultaneously enter a large or small market and earn 2n (n) divided by the
number of entrants if they enter the large (small) market.
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or equilibrium.18
3.1 Estimation method
The estimation procedure for EWA Lite is sketched brie°y here and detailed in Appendix.
Consider a game where N subjects play T rounds. For a given player i, the likelihood
function of observing a choice history of fsi(1);si(2); : : : ; si(T ¡ 1); si(T)g is given by:
¦Tt=1P
si(t)
i (t): (3.1)
The joint likelihood function L of observing all players' choice is given by
L(¸) = ¦Ni f¦Tt=1P si(t)i (t)g (3.2)
We \burn in" the model by choosing the initial attractions Aji(0) (the same for all
i) that correspond to choice probabilities that match the actual population frequency of
choices in the ¯rst period (given the estimate of ¸).19 (When data on initial choices are
unavailable some theory of initial play could be used instead.20) Details of the \burn-
in" are given in Appendix 6.1. The initial parameter values are Ái(0) = ·i(0) = :5 and
±i(0) = Ái(0)=W . These initial values are averaged with period-speci¯c values determined
by the functions, weighting the initial value by 1
t
and the functional value by t¡1
t
.
18Another approach is to sample randomly within a class of games, although results are likely to be
sensitive to which class of games is chosen.
19This is a small departure from some of our earlier work in which the Aji(0) are estimated as free
parameters. Estimation is infeasible in some of the games we study because there are many strategies
(e.g., integer prices from 80 to 200) and we were reluctant to impose ad hoc functional forms to generate
a parsimonious A
j
i(0) distribution.
20A mixture of random behavior and \level-1" reasoning{ best-responses to the belief that others will
behave randomly{ will generally be a good guess about what players would do in the ¯rst period (see
Ernan Haruvy and Stahl, 1998). In the games we study, for example, level-1 behavior predicts choices of
35 in beauty contests, 7 in continental- divide games, 4 in median-action games, the large pot in entry-
choice games, 5 and 4 in patent-race games for strong and weak players, and 200 ¡ 2R in traveller's
dilemma games. Combining these guesses with random initial behavior gives a good approximation to
what players actually do in the ¯rst period.
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Given the initial attractions and initial parameter values, attractions are updated us-
ing the EWA formula. EWA Lite parameters are then updated according to the functions
above. Maximum likelihood estimation is used to ¯nd the best-¯tting value of ¸ (and
other parameters, for the other models) using data from the ¯rst 70% of the subjects.
Then the value of ¸ is frozen and used to forecast behavior of the entire path of the re-
maining 30% of the subjects.21 Payo®s were all converted to dollars (which is important
for cross-game forecasting).
In addition to EWA Lite, we estimated the EWA model in Camerer and Ho (1999)
and versions of belief-based (weighted ¯ctitious play) and reinforcement models.22 To
put the models on a more even footing, we did not force the belief model to have initial
attractions which are consistent with a common initial belief (as in our earlier work); we
simply burned in the ¯rst-period data as for the other models.23 We ¯t three versions
of reinforcement (± = 0). Two versions included an experience weight N(0) (which
our 1999 paper did not) and ¯xed · to be either zero or one (the latter is a simpli¯ed
form of the model in Erev and Roth (1998)). A third version, which is quite di®erent,
is the two-parameter model used by Erev, Yoella Bereby-Meyer, and Roth (1999) and
Roth et al. (2000). Their new approach sets Á = 1 and · = 0, updates only chosen
strategies, uses logit probability instead of power, and divides attractions by a measure
of payo® variability (see Appendix 6.3 for details). We report only results from this latest
payo®-variability (PV) reinforcement model but performance of the earlier reinforcement
models is similar. We also ¯t the one-parameter quantal response equilibrium (QRE)
model (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995, see Appendix 6.2 for details) as a static benchmark,
21This is another departure from our earlier work, in which we used the ¯rst 70% of the observations
from each subject, then forecasted the last 30%. We also tried our earlier method, and a hybrid in
which the holdout sample consisted of both later periods for some subjects, and the entire path for new
subjects. The results from the two di®erent methods are not interestingly di®erent.
22For simplicity, we ignore two other interesting approaches to individual learning{ rule learning or
\learning to learn" (e.g., Stahl 1999; Salmon, 1999); and \direction learning" (Selten and Rolf Stoecker,
1986). See Camerer (2001, chapter 6) for more details.
23This switch helps belief models a lot in some games. For example, in the Mookerjhee-Sopher games
with mixed equilibrium one strategy is only weakly dominated, and is rarely chosen. Most prior belief
speci¯cations will assign an expected payo® to that strategy which is only a little less than the expected
payo®s of undominated strategies and given stochastic response, will overpredict how often the dominated
strategy is chosen.
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which is tougher competition than Nash equilibrium.
3.2 Model ¯t and predictive accuracy
The ¯rst question we answer is how well models ¯t and predict on a game-by-game basis
(i.e., parameters are estimated separately for each game). To guard against over¯tting we
estimate parameters using 70% of the subjects (in-sample calibration) and use those esti-
mates to predict choices by the remaining 30% (out-of-sample validation). For in-sample
estimation we report both hit rates (the fraction of choices predicted to be most likely
which are actually picked) and a Bayesian information criterion (BIC) which subtracts
a penalty k¢ln(NT )2 from the LL. (Note that the BIC imposes a sti®er penalty than other
information criteria like Akaike.24) For out-of-sample validation we report hit rates and
LL.
Table 2 shows the results. The best ¯ts for each game and criterion are printed in
bold; hit rates which are less than the best but are statistically indistinguishable (by
the McNemar test) are italicized. Across games, EWA is better or as good as all other
theories judging by hit rate, and ¯ts better according to BIC or LL in four of seven
games. EWA Lite also has higher or equal hit rates than other models in most games.
Reinforcement with PV has the best BIC and LL in two games. Of the learning models,
belief learning ¯ts worst (it never has the best BIC or LL and is only best on hit rate in
forecasting the median-action game). QRE ¯ts worst of all, except in games with mixed
equilibria where most models are about equally good.
The bottom line of each panel in Table 2, \pooled", shows results when a single set of
common parameters is estimated for all games (except for game-speci¯c ¸). If EWA Lite
is capturing parameter di®erences across games e®ectively, it should predict especially
accurately, compared to other models, when games are pooled. Indeed, EWA Lite ¯ts
and predicts best by both criteria when data are pooled.
24In Jae Myung (2000) discusses model selection, including some recent measures which penalize
theories for the °exibility of their functional form as well as for number of free parameters. He notes
in an example that the squared deviation or squared error criterion (MSD, or MSE) is the measure
which penalizes complex theories the least e®ectively. A very sensible measure, Bayesian model selection
(BMS) reduces to the BIC when the modeller has a di®use prior over parameter values.
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A tough test of robustness is to estimate all parameters on six of the seven games
and use those parameters to predict choices in the remaining game for all subjects, for
each of the seven games. Cross-game prediction has been used by others but only within
a narrow class of games (2x2 games with mixed equilibria, Erev and Roth, 1998; and
5x5 symmetric games, Stahl, forthcoming). Our results test whether ¯tting a model on
a coordination game, say, can predict behavior in a game with mixed equilibrium. Table
3 reports results from this kind of cross-game prediction. EWA Lite has the highest hit
rate in four games; EWA is highest in two other games. However, reinforcement with
PV also predicts across games reasonably well; it has the best LL in three games. The
biggest losers are belief models and QRE, which are usually much lower than the other
models by any criterion.
The point of EWA Lite is to use only structural features of games (i.e., W) and
players' experience to create parameter values which are close to the EWA estimates
across games. Figure 2 shows how well EWA Lite functional values of ± and Á match the
estimates from EWA. Each pair of connected points represents one of the seven games
and the pooled estimates. Open (closed) circles are EWA estimates (EWA Lite functional
values). If the two are close together within each game, and di®erent across games, the
chords connecting points should be short and sprinkled around the square. The chords
are short in about half the games (most of the long-chord deviation between the function
averages and estimate are on the Á dimension rather than ±). The correlation of the
estimates and functional averages across games (excluding pooling) is .92 for ± and .78
for Á.25 The pooled estimates only di®er by .01 and .02, respectively. Details are reported
in Table A.1 in Appendix (along with estimates for other models and standard errors).
In addition, Table A.2 in Appendix shows how much EWA Lite functional values
vary across time periods and across people. Variation is usually not very large; the
interquartile range is typically from zero to .10. An interesting exception is · in the
three games with mixed equilibria. The interquartile range for average · within subject
(i.e., averaged across periods) is .20 or more in these games. That means some subjects
are roughly choosing pure strategies (· near one) while others are mixing across all
strategies (· near zero), which shows the potential for the EWA Lite approach to detect
25The correspondence is much worse for ·, which is basically estimated to be either zero or one in
EWA but only varies from around .4 to .8 in EWA Lite.
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individual di®erences.
Next we will show predicted and relative frequencies for three games. Correspond-
ing graphs for all games can be seen at http://www.fba.nus.edu.sg /depart/mk/fbacjk
/ewalite/ewalite.html.26 We chose these three games because each has interesting di®er-
ences visible to the naked eye and each is representative of a di®erent class{ one has a
unique mixed-strategy equilibrium, one has multiple Pareto-ranked pure equilibria, and
one is dominance-solvable.
3.3 Games with unique mixed strategy equilibrium: Patent
race
In the patent race game (Rapoport and Amaldoss, 2000), two players, one strong and
one weak, are endowed with resources and compete in a patent race. The strong (weak)
player has an endowment of 5 (4) and can invest an integer amount from zero to their
endowments. Players invest simultaneously. They earn 10 minus their investment if their
investment is strictly largest, and lose their investment if it is less than or equal to the
other player's.
The game has an interesting strategic structure. The strong player can guarantee a
payo® of ¯ve by investing the entire endowment (outspending the weak player), which
strictly dominates investing zero. Eliminating the strong player's dominated (zero) strat-
egy then makes investing one dominated for the weak player. Iterating in this way, both
players can delete three strategies by iterated application of strict dominance. There is
a unique mixed equilibrium in which strong (weak) players invest 5 (0) 60% of the time
and play their other two (serially) undominated strategies 20% of the time.
Thirty six pairs of subjects played the game in a random matching protocol 160 times
(with the role switched after 80 rounds); the 36 pairs are divided into 2 groups where
random matching occurs within group. Choice frequencies do not change visibly across
26The website also has a GAUSS program readers can use to do their own estimation. Alternatively,
readers who send us data, or a speci¯ cation of their game, will receive estimates back for EWA Lite and
any other models described in this paper, within a month.
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time so we plot frequencies of transitions between period t ¡ 1 and period t strategies
instead, for strong players, using the within-game estimation and pooling across all sub-
jects. (Weak player results are similar.) Figures 3a-f show the empirical transition matrix
and predicted transition frequencies for ¯ve models on strong players. The key features
of the data are a lot of transitions from 5 to 5, almost 40%, and roughly equal numbers
of transitions (about 5%) from 1 to 1, and from 1 to 5 or vice versa.
Two models are clearly inferior: QRE does not predict di®erences in transitions at
all (it is a benchmark, not a learning theory); and the belief-based model predicts too
few 5-to-5 and 1-to-1 transitions. (Table 2 con¯rms that belief learning ¯ts relatively
poorly here.) Where does belief learning go wrong? Since belief learning assumes full
responsiveness to foregone payo®s, it will often predict that players should move away
from chosen strategies which were winners, if other strategies would have been even
better. Note that (as the equilibrium predicts) weak players abandon hope and invest
zero about half the time. As a result, when strong players invest 5, half the time they earn
a payo® of 5 but they could have earned more by investing less (because the weak player
invested nothing). Belief models therefore predict more switching away from investing
5 than is evident in the data. Both EWA and reinforcement approaches can explain
the infrequency of transitions by multiplying the higher foregone payo®s, in the case
where the strong player invests 5 and the weak player invests nothing, by ±. A low
value of ± (estimated to be .36 in EWA and .31 in EWA Lite) therefore characterizes the
sluggishness in switching and avoids the predictive mistake inherent in belief learning.
3.4 Games with multiple pure strategy equilibria: Continental
divide game
Van Huyck et al. (1997) studied a coordination game with multiple equilibria and extreme
sensitivity to initial conditions, which we call the continental divide game (CDG). The
payo®s in the game are shown in Table 4. Subjects play in cohorts of seven people.
Subjects choose an integer from 1 to 14, and their payo® depends on their own choice
and on the median choice of all seven players.
The payo® matrix is constructed so that there are two pure equilibria (at 3 and 12)
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which are Pareto-ranked (12 is the better one). Best responses to di®erent medians are
in bold. The best-response correspondence bifurcates in the middle: If the median starts
at 7 virtually any sort of learning dynamics will lead players toward the equilibrium at
3. If the median starts at 8 or above, however, learning will eventually converge to an
equilibrium of 12. Both equilibrium payo®s are shown in bold italics. The payo® at 3 is
about half as much as at 12. This game captures the possibility of extreme sensitivity to
initial conditions (or path-dependence).
Their experiment used 10 cohorts of seven subjects each, playing for 15 periods. At
the end of each period subjects learned the median, and played again with the same
group in a partner protocol. Payo®s were the amounts in the table, in pennies.
Figures 4a-f show empirical frequencies (pooling all subjects) and model predictions.
The key features of the data are: Bifurcation over time from choices in the middle of
the range (5-10) to the extremes, near the equilibria at 3 and 12; and late-period choices
are more clustered around 12 than around 3. (Figure 4a disguises the extreme path-
dependence: Groups which had ¯rst-period medians below (above) 7 always converged
toward the low (high) equilibrium.) Notice also that strategies 1-4 are never chosen in
early periods, but are frequently chosen in later periods; and notice that strategies 7-9
are frequently chosen in early periods but never chosen in later periods. A good model
should be able to capture these subtle e®ects by "accelerating" low choices quickly (going
from zero to frequent choices in a few periods) and "braking" midrange choices quickly
(going from frequent choices to zero).
QRE ¯ts poorly because it predicts no movement. Belief learning does not reproduce
the asymmetry between sharp convergence to the high equilibrium and °atter frequencies
around the low equilibrium. The reason why is diagnostic of a subtle weakness in belief
learning. Note from Table 4 that the payo® gradients around the equilibria at 3 and
12 are exactly the same{ choosing one number too high or low \costs" $.02; choosing
two numbers too high or low costs $.08, and so forth. Since belief learning computes
expected payo®s, and the logit rule means only di®erences in expected payo®s in°uence
choice probability, the fact that the payo® gradients are the same means the spread of
probability around the two equilibria must be the same; so belief learning will predict
similar probability distributions around the high and low equilibria.
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But how do the EWA and reinforcement models generate the asymmetry? The trick
is a combination of ± < 1 and cumulation (high ·). At the high equilibrium, the payo®s
are larger and so the di®erence between the received payo® and ± times the foregone
payo® will be larger than at the low equilibrium if ± < 1, which explains the sharper
convergence around 12.27
Reinforcement with PV ¯ts reasonably well, except it predicts frequencies for choices
3-5 which are too low (10% instead of 15%) and it predicts substantial early choice of
strategies 1-2 which declines over time. (The EWA models smear a little probability at
1-2, and grow over time, to avoid a large likelihood penalty from missing the rare choices
of 1 and 2 which come in later periods.)
3.5 Games with dominance-solvable pure strategy equilibrium:
Traveller's dilemma
Capra et al. (1999) studied a dominance-solvable \traveler's dilemma" (introduced by
Kaushik Basu, 1984) in which two players must choose a number or `claim' between 80
and 200. If the claims are equal, each player receives the amount claimed. If the claims
are unequal, each of them receives the lower of the two claims. In addition, the person
who makes the lower claim receives a bonus R and the person who makes the higher
claim pays a penalty of R. Let these claims be x1 and x2 respectively. Formally, the
payo® to each player i is de¯ned as follows:
¼i(xi; x¡i) =
8>>><>>>:
xi if xi = x¡i
xi +R if xi < x¡i
x¡i ¡R if xi > x¡i
(3.3)
27Numerically, a player who chooses 3 when the median is 3 earns $.60 and has a foregone payo® from 2
or 4 of $.58 ¢±. The corresponding ¯gures for a player choosing 12 are $1.12 and $1:10 ¢±. The di®erences
in received and foregone payo®s around 12 and around 3 are the same when ± = 1 but the di®erence
around 12 grows larger as ± falls (for example, for the EWA Lite estimate ±^ = :69, the di®erences are
$.20 and $.36 for 3 and 12.) Cumulating payo®s rather than averaging them contributes to explaining
the di®erence by \blowing up" the expected payo® di®erences over time.
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The game is like one of imperfect competition in which two sellers both sell products at
the lowest price (due to consumer shopping or \meet-or-release" clauses) and the seller
who names the lowest price earns a goodwill reward while the high-price sellers su®ers
a reputational loss. The Nash equilibrium predicts that the lowest possible claim of 80
will be chosen by both players. This prediction is also insensitive to R.
Their experiment used six groups of 9-12 subjects. The reward/penalty R was varied
at 6 levels (5, 10, 20, 25, 50, 80). Each subject played 10 times (and played with a
di®erent R for ¯ve more rounds; we use only the ¯rst 10 rounds).28
Figures 5a-f show empirical frequencies and model ¯ts for R=50. (Other values of R
give roughly similar results although R=50 illustrates di®erences across models best.) A
wide range of prices are named in the ¯rst round. Prices gradually fall, between 91-100
in rounds 3-5, 81-90 in rounds 5-6, and toward the equilibrium of 80 in later rounds.
QRE predicts a spike at the equilibrium of 80. As ¸ rises, the QRE equilibria move
sharply from smearing probability throughout the price range to a sharp spike at the
equilibrium; there is no intermediate value of ¸ which can explain the combination of
initial dispersion and sharp convergence in later periods.
The belief-based model predicts the correct direction of convergence, but overpredicts
numbers in the interval 81-90 and underpredicts choices of precisely 80. The problem
is that the incentive in the travellers' dilemma is to undercut the other player's price
by as little as possible. Players only choose 80 frequently in the last couple of periods;
before those periods it pays to choose higher numbers. The belief model also estimates
Á^ = :85 and does not allow payo®s to cumulate, so there is a large burden of historical
information which keeps the model from reacting quickly to frequent choices of 80 which
come late in the game. EWA models explain the sharp convergence in late periods by
cumulating payo®s and estimating ± = :63 (for EWA Lite). Consider two players who
choose 80 and 90 when R=50. The player who chose 80 is reinforced by 130, and choosing
the best response 89 is reinforced by 139 ¢ :63, or 88.1, so choosing 80 is more strongly
reinforced and she is likely to repeat that choice. In belief learning, the best response
28We did not use R = 10 with 9 subjects, where there is always one subject gone unmatched in each
round, to avoid making ad hoc assumptions on the learning behavior of the unmatched subjects.
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of 89 is reinforced by 139 so she is predicted to move away from 80, contrary to what
happens.
The reinforcement model has a reasonable hit rate because the highest spikes in the
graph often correspond with spikes in the data, but predicted learning is clearly more
sluggish than in the data (i.e., the spikes are not high enough). Because e®ectively Á = 1
and players are not predicted to move toward ex-post best responses, the model cannot
explain why players learn to choose 80 so rapidly. (Reinforcement models with variable
Á and no payo® variability term predict much better when R=50.)
4 Economic value of learning model
The criteria used to judge ¯t and predictive accuracy of models are purely statistical,
or are roughly equivalent to familiar statistics. But economic applications of theories
demand a ¯nancial measure of what good theories are worth.
In this section we measure the economic value of a learning theory. Camerer and
Ho (2001) de¯ned a theory's economic value as the increase in a subject's pro¯t from
substituting learning theory recommendations{ best responses based on the theory's
prediction about what others will do{ for their actual choices. This de¯nition treats a
theory as similar to the advice service professionals (like consultants) sell, and measures
its value by the di®erence in economic quality of the client's decisions with and without
the advice.
To measure economic value, we use model parameters and a player's observed ex-
perience through period t to generate model predictions about what others will do in
t + 1. That prediction (a probability distribution over choices by others) produces a
choice with the highest expected value. We then compare the pro¯t from making that
choice in t+1 (given what other players did in t+ 1) with pro¯t from the target player's
actual choice. Economic value is a good measure because it uses the full distribution of
predictions about what other players are likely to do, and the economic impact of those
possible choices.
26
We use two methods to estimate model parameters: Using in-game estimated param-
eters (see Appendix Table A.1); and using estimates from the six other games to compute
economic value in the seventh game, for each of the seven games (as in Table 3). Using
all the data from a game to give advice to subjects in that game is like advising a client
who has a large sample of experience in a particular situation for the analyst to estimate
parameters with. Using only data from other games is like advising a client in a new
situation who has no direct experience for the analyst to use to estimate parameters.
In practice, economic value would generally fall between the bounds of economic value
computed these two ways. Note also that we do not control for the boomerang e®ect of
a recommended choice on future behavior by others, but this e®ect will be small in most
of the cases we study.29
Table 5 shows the overall economic value{ the percentage improvement (or decline)
in payo®s of subjects from following a model recommendation rather than their actual
choices. Most models have positive economic value in most games. Value generated from
in-game estimates is usually higher than when parameters are estimated from di®erent
games. Using either method of parameter estimation, either EWA Lite or EWA have the
most economic value in ¯ve to seven of the seven games. Subject-by-subject analysis in
Table 6 also shows that EWA and EWA Lite add value for a large majority of subjects30,
from 54% to 97% for out-of-game estimates (except pot games, where the ¯gure is 48%).
Note that the percentage improvement is sometimes small because the di®erence
between observed payo®s and ex-post optimal payo®s{ the payo®s that a perfectly clair-
voyant player would have earned{ is often low, which puts an upper bound on absolute
29That is, if a player actually chose 9 in the continental divide game and a theory advised choosing
10, in future periods we continue to assume the subject chose 9. Note however that in the coordination
and p-beauty contest games medians and averages are computed for groups of 7-9 players, so changing
one player's choice will not a®ect overall behavior much. In the travellers' dilemma players are randomly
rematched so changing one player's current choice may a®ect her current partner's future behavior,
but she is unlikely to be rematched with same partner. The e®ect could be more substantial in mixed
and patent race games, and in the pot games with small numbers of subjects. The obvious correction,
which we are pursuing, is to run experiments in which one or more computerized subjects actually use
a learning model to make choices, and compare their performance with that of actual subjects.
30In some games many estimates of economic value are zero because subjects make the same choices
the learning theories recommend.
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economic value. In the continental divide game, for example, perfect forecasts would have
improved pro¯ts by 6.58% and EWA Lite improved pro¯ts (out-of-game) by 4.98%, so
the EWA Lite forecast improve pro¯ts by about 80% of the largest possible improvement.
Belief learning also has positive economic value in almost all games. Reinforcement
actually has negative economic value in one to three games. In continental divide games,
reinforcement tends to underpredict how rapidly players move away from middle strate-
gies. It therefore advises players to switch to low or high strategies less quickly than
they actually do, which turns out to be bad advice. The beauty contest game is similar.
Reinforcement predicts hardly any learning by other players, so it never advises players
to chose numbers which are low enough.
5 Conclusion
Learning is important for economics. Equilibrium theories are useful because they suggest
a possible limit point of a learning process and permit comparative static analysis. But
if learning is slow, or the time path of behavior selects one equilibrium out of many, a
precise theory of equilibration could prove useful.
In the last ten years, many theories of individual learning in games have been proposed
and ¯t to data from laboratory games in which experimenters have good control over
players' information and incentives. Some of these theories, particularly reinforcement
learning and ¯ctitious play or Cournot belief learning, are very simple (i.e., they have
few free parameters which have to be speci¯ed or estimated from data). Simple theories
have the advantage of parsimony but often miss important features of empirical data
and, importantly, can be improved by adding features judiciously. Other theories are
quite complex (e.g., Crawford, 1995; Stahl, 1999).
Because there are many theories, applied to di®erent games using di®erent scienti¯c
standards of proof or utility, some healthy controversy has emerged about which models
are best for which purposes. Our earlier theory (Camerer and Ho, 1999), parametric
EWA (EWA for short) takes a middle road by hybridizing features of reinforcement and
belief learning, which necessarily adds parameters. Estimates across two dozen experi-
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mental data sets show that adding these features improves ¯t and predictive accuracy,
but the parameter values which maximize ¯t are typically signi¯cantly di®erent in di®er-
ent games. This ¯nding raises the question of how to predict in advance which parameter
values will ¯t best in a particular game.
The theory described in this paper, EWA Lite, replaces three parameters in the EWA
learning models with three functions that change over time in response to experience.
One function is a \motion detector" Á which goes up (limited by one) when behavior
by other players is stable, and dips down (limited by zero) when there is surprising new
behavior by others. When Á dips down, the e®ects of old experience (summarized in
attractions which cumulate or average previous payo®s) is diminished by decaying the
old attraction by a lot. The second function ± is simply Á divided by W , the minimal
number of strategies in equilibrium. This function ties responsiveness to foregone payo®s
to environmental stability, and also lowers ± in games with mixed equilibria (W > 1). The
third function · is an index of concentration of choices (a normalized Gini coe±cient).
This characterizes players who \explore" a lot (trying di®erent strategies, yielding a low
·) and those who \exploit" by locking in to a single choice (high ·). EWA Lite is more
parsimonious than most learning theories because it has only one free parameter{ the
response sensitivity ¸.
We ¯t and predict data from seven di®erent experimental games using EWA Lite, our
previous parameterized EWA model, and three other models (belief learning, reinforce-
ment with payo® variability, and quantal response equilibrium (QRE)). Note that QRE
and EWA Lite both have one free parameter, reinforcement has two, belief learning has
three, and EWA has ¯ve. We always report both in-sample ¯t (penalizing more complex
theories using the Bayesian information criterion) and out-of-sample predictive accuracy
to be sure that more complex models do not necessarily ¯t better.
There are three key results.
First, EWA Lite solves a potential problem with application of the EWA model across
games because it endogenizes EWA parameters e®ectively. It ¯ts and predicts about as
accurately as EWA in all seven games; and it produces functional parameter values for ±
and Á which track estimated values quite closely across games. Because EWA Lite gen-
erates sensible cross-game parameter variation automatically, it ¯ts and predicts better
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than all other models when games are pooled and common parameters are estimated.
Second, we use a new criterion for judging the usefulness of theories, called economic
value (introduced by Camerer and Ho, 2001). A theory's economic value is the incremen-
tal pro¯t a subject would earn from following the theory's advice rather than making
their own choices. Either EWA or EWA Lite add the most economic value (and add
positive value for a majority of subjects), in ¯ve or seven of the seven games, depending
on how parameters are estimated to provide advice. Reinforcement models actually have
negative economic value in one to three games (depending on estimation).
What's the bottom line? Because we used many criteria and games, it is not surprising
that no one theory is always best. The results are sensitive to which games are used, but
not sensitive to performance criteria. In coordination and dominance-solvable games,
either EWA or EWA Lite ¯t and predict best and add the most economic value. In
mixed-strategy games reinforcement ¯ts a little better than the EWA models by statistical
criteria, and adds similar economic value. Belief models hardly ever ¯t best (EWA Lite is
simpler and almost always ¯ts better). And all learning theories ¯t reliably better than
QRE.
A next step in this research is to apply EWA Lite to a wider set of games. We would
also like to ¯nd some axiomatic underpinnings for the functions, which are admittedly
ad hoc. Extending the Á function to exploit information about ordered strategies might
prove useful. And since EWA Lite is so parsimonious, it is useful as a building block for
extending learning theories to include sophistication (players anticipating that others are
learning; see Stahl, 1999) and explain \teaching" behavior in repeated games (Camerer,
Ho and Chong, 2000; David Cooper and John Kagel, 2001).
The theory is developed to ¯t experimental data, but the bigger scienti¯c payo® will
come from application to naturally-occurring situations. If learning is slow, a precise
theory of economic equilibration is just as useful for predicting what happens in the
economy as a theory of equilibrium. For example, institutions for matching medical
residents and medical schools, and analogous matching in college sororities and college
bowl games, developed over decades (Roth and Xiaolin Xing, 1994). Bidders in eBay
auctions learn to bid late to hide their information about an object's common value
(Patrick Bajari and Ali Hortacsu, 1999). Consumers learn over time what products they
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like (Ho and Chong, 1999). Learning in ¯nancial markets can generate excess volatility
and returns predictability, which are otherwise anomalous in rational expectations models
(Allan Timmerman, 1993). Thomas Sargent (1999) argues that learning by policymakers
about expectational Phillips' curves and the public's perceptions of in°ation explains
macroeconomic behavior in the last couple of decades. Good theories of learning should
be able to explain these patterns and help predict how new institutions will evolve, how
rapidly bidders learn to wait, and which new products will succeed. Applying EWA Lite
to ¯eld domains is therefore an important goal of future research.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Calculating the Initial Attractions
We \burn in" the initial attractions Aj(0), 8j, by using the actual observed frequency of
choices by all subjects in the ¯rst period. The same initial attractions are used for all
subjects, except for games with more than 2 players such as continental divide, median
action and p-beauty contest. For the exceptions, each group of players has a di®erent
initial attractions based on the group's observed frequencies. For a particular response
sensitivity ,¸ the initial attractions are chosen so that the predicted probabilities of
choices match the actual relative frequencies of choices.
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Denote the empirically observed frequency of strategy j in the ¯rst period by fj.
Then initial attractions are recovered from the equations
e¸¢Aj(0)P
k e¸¢A
k(0)
= fj ; j = 1; : : : ;m: (6.1)
(This is equivalent to choosing initial attractions to maximize the likelihood of the ¯rst-
period data, separately from the rest of the data, for a value of ¸ derived from the overall
likelihood-maximization.) Some algebra shows that the initial attractions can be solved
for, as a function of ¸, by
Aj(0)¡ Ak(0) = 1
¸
ln(fj)¡ 1
¸
ln(fk); j; k = 1; : : : ;m (6.2)
We ¯x the initial attraction of the strategy j with the lowest frequencyAj(0) to a constant
value for identi¯cation. Frequently, the lowest frequency is zero. We circumvent this
problem by adding a constant W
m
to all frequencies and renormalizing them.
~fj =
fj + W
mP
k fk +
W
m
; j = 1; : : : ;m (6.3)
W
m
is chosen to re°ect the relative proportion of equilibrium points with respect to number
of strategies. With ~fj in place of f j in (6.2), we then solve for the other attractions as a
function of ¸ and the modi¯ed frequencies ~fj .
To ensure no model obtains any unfair advantage from the burn in procedure, we use
(6.1) as the ¯rst period prediction for all models.
Since the model speci¯cations for EWA Lite, EWA and Belief-based learning have
been discussed in the text, we only provide the model speci¯cations for the remaining
models, Quantal Response and Reinforcement with Payo® Variability, below.
6.2 Quantal Response Model
The updating rule and predicted probability are given as follows:
Aji (t) =
m¡iX
k=1
Pk¡i(t+ 1) ¢ ¼i(sji ; sk¡i(t)) (6.4)
P ji (t+ 1) =
e¸¢A
j
i (t)Pmi
k=1 e
¸¢Aki (t)
(6.5)
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As evident from (6.5), the predicted probability is a function of other player(s) pre-
dicted probabilities. For a given sensitivity parameter ,¸ predicted probabilities are
derived from solving N nonlinear simultaneous equations. We solve the nonlinear simul-
taneous equations numerically by iterative substitutions until we converge to a set of
consistent predicted probabilities.
6.3 Reinforcement Model with Payo® Variability
The updating rule is:
Aji (t) =
(N(0) +Cij(t) ¡ 1) ¢ Aji (t¡ 1) + I(sji ; si(t)) ¢ ¼i(sji ;s¡i(t))
N(0) +Cij(t)
(6.6)
where Cij(t) (with Cij(0) = 0; 8i; j) is updated as follows:
Cij(t) =
8<: Cij(t¡ 1) + 1 if j is chosen in tCij(t¡ 1) if j is not chosen in t (6.7)
In addition, ¸ is replaced by ¸
Si(t)
where
Si(t) =
(t¡ 1 +m ¢N(0))Si(t¡ 1) + j¼i(t¡ 1)¡¼i(si(t); s¡i(t))j
t+m ¢N(0) (6.8)
where m is the number of strategies and Ai(t) is updated as follows:
¼i(t) =
(t¡ 1 +m ¢N(0))¼i(t¡ 1) + ¼i(si(t);s¡i(t))
t+ m ¢N(0) (6.9)
where ¼i(0) is the expected payo® given random choice. Instead of assuming random
choices by other players in the computation of ¼i(0), we use empirical distribution of
other players' ¯rst period choices to increase the potency of the model. This also ensures
that the Reinforcement Model with Payo® Variability is placed on the same footing as
other models where ¯rst period is used to burn in initial attractions. Si(0) is the expected
absolute di®erence between payo® from each strategy and ¼i(0).
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6.4 Parameter Estimates and Functional Values
Table A.1 gives the parameter estimates and their standard errors of all learning models.
Note that the standard errors are small, suggesting that these parameters are statistically
di®erent from zero. Table A.2 shows the inter-quartile ranges of EWA Lite functional
values across time and subjects. Except for · in some games, the ranges are relatively
small.
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Table 1: A Description of the Seven Games Used in the Estimation of Various Learning Models
Game Number of Number of Number of Pure Number of Number of Matching Experimental Description of Games
Players Strategies Strategy Equilibria Subjects Rounds Protocol Treatment
Mixed Strategies 2 4,6 0 80 40 Fixed Stake Size A constant-sum game with unique mixed
Mookerjhee and Sopher (1997) strategy equilibrium. 
Patent Race 2 5,6 0 36 80 Random Strong vs Weak Strong (weak) player invests between
Rapoport and Amaldoss (2000) 0 and 5 (0 and 4) and the higher investment
wins a fixed prize.
Continental Divide 7 14 2 70 15 Fixed None A coordination game with two pure strategy 
Van Huyck et al. (1997) equilibria
Median Action 9 7 7 54 10 Fixed None A order-statistic game with individual payoff
Van Huyck et al. (1990) decreases in the distance between individual
choice and the median
Pot Games 3,6,9,18 2 1 84 25 (manual) Fixed Number of Players An entry game where players must decide
Amaldoss and Ho (2001) 28 (computer) which of the two ponds of sizes 2n and n 
they wish to enter. Payoff is the ratio of the pond
size and number of entries.
Traveller's Dilemma 2 1211 1 52 10 Random Penalty Size Players choose claims between 80 and 200.
Capra et al. (1999) Both players get lower claim but the high-claim
player pays a penalty to the low-claim player.
 
p-Beauty Contest 7 101 1 196 10 Fixed Experienced vs. Inexperienced Players simultaneously choose a number
Ho et al. (1998) from 0 to 100 and the winner whose number is
closet to p (<1) times the group average
Note 1: Continuous strategies of 80 to 200 are discretized to 121 integer strategies
Table 2: Model Fit and Prediction (% Hit Rate, BIC and Log Likelihood)
Sample 
Size5 %Hit1,4 BIC2 %Hit BIC %Hit BIC %Hit BIC %Hit BIC
Mixed Strategies 2240 40% -3192 41% -3074 38% -3129 41% -3051 31% -3340
Patent Race 4000 62% -4442 61% -4411 53% -5506 62% -4367 38% -6682
Continental Divide 735 50% -1081 51% -1062 30% -1289 47% -1293 6% -1888
Median Action 380 69% -313 75% -272 74% -348 69% -343 50% -541
Pot Games 1478 68% -905 67% -937 65% -982 66% -907 62% -1018
Traveller's Dilemma 360 52% -889 50% -871 31% -1115 46% -1070 25% -1764
p-Beauty Contest 1380 13% -4567 13% -4539 13% -4578 10% -5736 3% -5844
Pooled 3 10573 51% -15388 48% -15906 40% -17960 44% -20182 33% -21055
Sample 
Size %Hit LL %Hit LL %Hit LL %Hit LL %Hit LL
Mixed Strategies 960 36% -1382 36% -1387 34% -1405 33% -1392 35% -1400
Patent Race 1760 65% -1897 65% -1878 53% -2279 65% -1864 40% -2914
Continental Divide 315 47% -470 47% -460 25% -565 44% -573 6% -805
Median Action 160 74% -104 79% -83 82% -95 74% -105 49% -187
Pot Games 739 70% -436 70% -437 66% -471 70% -432 65% -505
Traveller's Dilemma 160 46% -445 43% -443 36% -465 41% -561 27% -720
p-Beauty Contest 580 8% -2119 6% -2042 7% -2051 7% -2494 3% -2502
Pooled 4674 51% -6852 49% -7100 40% -7935 46% -9128 36% -9037
Note 1: Number of hits counts the occasions when prob(chosen strategy) = maximum (predicted probabilities). Each count is adjusted by number of strategies sharing the maximum. 
Note 2: BIC (Bayesian Information Criterion) is given by LL - (k/2)*log(N*T) where k is the number of parameters, N is the number of subjects and T is the number of periods.
Note 3: A common set of parameters, except game-specific lambda, is estimated for all games. Each games is given equal weight in LL estimation.
Note 4: Entries in bold denote the best measures for each game. In case of hit rate, multiple models might share the top rank when differences in hit rates of 
these models are not statistically significant by McNemar test (Chi-sq at 5%); these entries are italicized.
Note 5: Calibrated on all observations for 70% of the subjects instead of 70% observations of all subjects as in Camerer and Ho (1999).
Out-of-sample Validation
EWA Lite EWA Belief-based Reinforcement with PV QRE
Reinforcement with PV QRE
In-sample Calibration
EWA Lite EWA Belief-based
Table 3: Model Robustness (Out-of-sample Prediction for New Game)
Sample 
Size %Hit LL %Hit LL %Hit LL %Hit LL %Hit LL
Mixed Strategies 3200 39% -4662 34% -4867 35% -4832 38% -4697 31% -5049
Patent Race 5760 62% -8009 59% -9296 55% -9112 63% -6588 39% -9745
Continental Divide 1050 48% -1741 50% -1635 27% -2147 32% -2403 6% -2695
Median Action 540 69% -523 74% -491 60% -711 70% -479 50% -990
Pot Games 2217 68% -3976 67% -5084 65% -3474 67% -1387 63% -1491
Traveller's Dilemma 520 50% -1825 46% -1874 33% -1933 36% -1841 21% -2325
p-Beauty Contest 1960 12% -6681 10% -6819 8% -7715 9% -11361 3% -8342
Note 1:Prediction for a game is made using out-of-game estimates derived from pooling the other 6 games.
Out-of-sample Prediction using Out-of-game Estimates1 
EWA Lite EWA Belief-based Reinforcement with PV QRE
Table 4: Payo®s in `continental divide' experiment, Van Huyck et al. (1997)
Median Choice
choice 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1 45 49 52 55 56 55 46 -59 -88 -105 -117 -127 -135 - 142
2 48 53 58 62 65 66 61 -27 -52 -67 -77 -86 -92 -98
3 48 54 60 66 70 74 72 1 - 20 -32 -41 -48 -53 -58
4 43 51 58 65 71 77 80 26 8 -2 -9 -14 -19 -22
5 35 44 52 60 69 77 83 46 32 25 19 15 12 10
6 23 33 42 52 62 72 82 62 53 47 43 41 39 38
7 7 18 28 40 51 64 78 75 69 66 64 63 62 62
8 -13 -1 11 23 37 51 69 83 81 80 80 80 81 82
9 -37 -24 -11 3 18 35 57 88 89 91 92 94 96 98
10 -65 -51 -37 -21 -4 15 40 89 94 98 101 104 107 110
11 -97 -82 -66 -49 -31 -9 20 85 94 100 105 110 114 119
12 -133 -117 -100 -82 -61 -37 -5 78 91 99 106 112 118 123
13 -173 -156 -137 -118 -96 -69 -33 67 83 94 103 110 117 123
14 -217 -198 -179 -158 -134 -105 -65 52 72 85 95 104 112 120
Table 5: Economic Values (Performance of a Bionic Subject) with In-game and Out-of-game Estimates
Observed
Payoff %Improve %Improve %Improve %Improve %Improve %Improve
Mixed Strategies 334 100.0% 7.5% 3.0% 1.1% 5.8% -1.8%
Patent Race 467 44.2% 1.7% 1.2% 1.3% 2.9% 1.2%
Continental Divide2 837 6.6% 5.0% 5.2% 4.5% -9.4% -30.5%
Median Action2 503 1.8% 1.5% 1.5% 1.2% 1.3% -1.0%
Pot Games 4244 29.9% -2.7% -1.1% -1.3% -1.9% 9.9%
Traveller's Dilemma 541 26.2% 10.3% 9.8% 9.4% 3.4% 2.7%
p-Beauty Contest2 519 585.4% 49.9% 40.8% 26.7% -7.2% -64.0%
Observed
Payoff %Improve %Improve %Improve %Improve %Improve %Improve
Mixed Strategies 334 100.0% 13.0% 15.9% 14.1% 13.0% 1.0%
Patent Race 467 44.2% 3.0% 1.9% 2.9% 1.5% 1.2%
Continental Divide2 837 6.6% 5.3% 5.3% 5.2% 3.9% -31.6%
Median Action2 503 1.8% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 1.2% -1.0%
Pot Games 4244 29.9% 7.7% 11.1% 6.1% 9.3% 9.9%
Traveller's Dilemma 541 26.2% 11.0% 11.1% 9.5% 8.2% 7.6%
p-Beauty Contest2 519 585.4% 52.1% 55.1% 54.1% -60.8% -64.0%
Note 1: We assume that each bionic subject use the respective model to predict other's behavior and best responds with the strategy that yields the highest expected payoff.
Note 2: The expected value of each strategy in these games is computed with 1000 simulated instances for a given round due to high computational burden for actual derivation.
QRE
Total Payoff and Percentage Improvement for Bionic Subjects using In-game Estimates1 
EWA Lite EWA Belief-based Reinforcement with PVEx-post
Reinforcement with PV QRE
Total Payoff and Percentage Improvement for Bionic Subjects using Out-of-game Estimates1 
EWA Lite EWA Belief-basedEx-post
Table 6: Bionic Subjects with Better or Equal Payoffs using In-game and Out-of-game Estimates
Total
Subjects % Improve % Improve % Improve % Improve % Improve
Mixed Strategies 8000.0% 61.3% 53.8% 51.3% 57.5% 43.8%
Patent Race 7200.0% 54.2% 54.2% 52.8% 56.9% 52.8%
Continental Divide 7000.0% 94.3% 97.1% 85.7% 15.7% 0.0%
Median Action 5400.0% 87.0% 94.4% 83.3% 85.2% 53.7%
Pot Games 8400.0% 47.6% 48.8% 48.8% 56.0% 84.5%
Traveller's Dilemma 5200.0% 94.2% 90.4% 84.6% 76.9% 55.8%
p-Beauty Contest 19600.0% 68.9% 61.2% 59.2% 53.1% 19.4%
Total
Subjects % Improve % Improve % Improve % Improve % Improve
Mixed Strategies 8000.0% 70.0% 73.8% 75.0% 71.3% 47.5%
Patent Race 7200.0% 59.7% 54.2% 62.5% 52.8% 52.8%
Continental Divide 7000.0% 100.0% 98.6% 95.7% 77.1% 0.0%
Median Action 5400.0% 90.7% 96.3% 96.3% 85.2% 53.7%
Pot Games 8400.0% 77.4% 84.5% 71.4% 79.8% 84.5%
Traveller's Dilemma 5200.0% 96.2% 96.2% 90.4% 88.5% 67.3%
p-Beauty Contest 19600.0% 70.4% 68.9% 68.4% 23.0% 19.4%
Number of Bionic Subjects with Better or Equal Payoff using Out-of-game Estimates
Number of Bionic Subjects with Better or Equal Payoff using In-game Estimates
EWA Lite EWA Belief-based Reinforcement with PV QRE
Reinforcement with PV QREEWA Lite EWA Belief-based
Table A.1: Parameter Estimates of Learning Models
f k d N0 3 l 5 
Mixed Strategies 0.89 - 0.52 - 0.28 - 1.00 - 3.78 0.17
Patent Race 0.89 - 0.72 - 0.32 - 1.00 - 7.87 0.17
Continental Divide 0.69 - 0.77 - 0.69 - 1.00 - 4.46 0.18
Median Action 0.85 - 0.78 - 0.85 - 1.00 - 5.00 0.33
Pot Games 0.80 - 0.44 - 0.44 - 1.00 - 0.33 0.03
Traveller's Dilemma 0.63 - 0.84 - 0.63 - 1.00 - 4.99 0.20
p-Beauty Contest 0.58 - 0.82 - 0.58 - 1.00 - 2.11 0.05
Pooled 0.76 - 0.64 - 0.48 - 1.00 - 3.26 0.05
f k d N04  l
Mixed Strategies 0.98 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.27 0.07 0.82 0.00 1.15 0.10
Patent Race 0.92 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.36 0.25 1.37 0.02 42.21 4.57
Continental Divide 0.74 0.03 1.00 0.02 0.73 0.09 0.25 0.00 3.98 0.30
Median Action 0.71 0.07 1.00 0.02 0.89 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.90 1.12
Pot Games 0.81 0.04 1.00 0.09 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.03
Traveller's Dilemma 0.77 0.02 1.00 0.02 0.53 0.07 0.62 0.00 3.53 0.22
p-Beauty Contest 0.36 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.78 0.05 1.56 0.00 3.44 0.00
Pooled 2 0.78 0.01 0.99 0.01 0.49 0.00 0.01 0.00 2.95 0.02
f k 3 d 3 N04  l
Mixed Strategies 1.00 0.00 0.00 - 1.00 - 72.59 2.18 43.34 0.24
Patent Race 1.00 0.00 0.00 - 1.00 - 27.78 141.08 85.09 0.01
Continental Divide 0.99 0.05 0.00 - 1.00 - 1.11 0.15 14.76 1.26
Median Action 1.00 0.00 0.00 - 1.00 - 5.48 8.58 75.84 0.08
Pot Games 0.98 0.04 0.00 - 1.00 - 0.49 0.17 0.91 0.13
Traveller's Dilemma 0.85 0.01 0.00 - 1.00 - 6.74 1.51 13.97 0.85
p-Beauty Contest 0.40 0.02 0.00 - 1.00 - 0.79 0.40 2.95 0.08
Pooled  0.81 0.02 0.00 - 1.00 - 5.36 0.49 11.59 0.48
f 3 k 3 d 3 N0 l
Mixed Strategies 1.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 31.47 0.91 4.39 0.52
Patent Race 1.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 6.58 0.03 1.48 0.05
Continental Divide 1.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 1.81 0.13 2.59 0.03
Median Action 1.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 3.95 0.24 1.27 0.19
Pot Games 1.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.49 0.03 0.39 0.03
Traveller's Dilemma 1.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 3.92 0.03 3.19 0.03
p-Beauty Contest 1.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 1.78 0.01 0.22 0.01
Pooled  1.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 188.10 0.24 24.49 0.10
f 3 k 3 d 3 N03 l
Mixed Strategies 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 10.27 0.08
Patent Race 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 4.60 0.04
Continental Divide 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.63 0.01
Median Action 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 20.00 0.00
Pot Games 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.04 0.00
Traveller's Dilemma 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 20.00 0.00
p-Beauty Contest 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 0.00
Pooled  0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 7.78 0.01
Note 1: Average parameters across subjects and time.
Note 2: For all models except EWA Lite, a common set of estimates, except lambdas, is estimated for all games pooled.
Note 3: Fixed parameters
Note 4: N0 bounded by 1/(1-phi(1-kappa)).
Note 5: Payoffs in all games have been rescaled to USD equivalent. Average of game specific lambda is reported for pooled games.
Reinforcement with PV
QRE
EWA Lite 1 
EWA
Belief-based
Table A.2: Variations of EWA Lite Functional Values
Median3 Range4 Median Range Median Range
Mixed Strategies 0.91 0.0396 0.50 0.1027 0.30 0.1137
Patent Race 0.90 0.0200 0.73 0.0151 0.31 0.0078
Continental Divide 0.69 0.0806 0.78 0.0165 0.69 0.0806
Median Action 0.91 0.1875 0.81 0.1513 0.91 0.1875
Pot Games 0.81 0.0635 0.44 0.1329 0.44 0.0464
Traveller's Dilemma 0.62 0.0722 0.89 0.0926 0.62 0.0722
p-Beauty Contest 0.58 0.0375 0.88 0.0673 0.58 0.0375
Pooled 0.87 0.1218 0.57 0.2610 0.35 0.1512
Median Range Median Range Median Range
Mixed Strategies 0.89 0.0357 0.52 0.1504 0.27 0.1026
Patent Race 0.89 0.0133 0.74 0.2036 0.32 0.0044
Continental Divide 0.68 0.0820 0.78 0.0835 0.68 0.0820
Median Action 0.85 0.0000 0.79 0.0432 0.85 0.0000
Pot Games 0.78 0.0167 0.38 0.3247 0.43 0.0074
Traveller's Dilemma 0.62 0.0830 0.84 0.0121 0.62 0.0830
p-Beauty Contest 0.58 0.0156 0.82 0.0139 0.58 0.0156
Pooled 0.76 0.2694 0.82 0.2057 0.57 0.2664
Note 1: Average value for each time period is calculated, then the 25% and 75% percentile are used to derive the range.
Note 2: Average value for each subject is calculated, then the 25% and 75% percentile are used to derive the range.
Note 3: Overall medians on the average values calculated with respect to Note 1 and 2.
Note 4: The 25% and 75% percentile are respectively 0.5*Range below and above the median.
f k d
Interquartile Range Across Time1 
Interquartile Range Across Subjects2 
f k d
Figure 1: EWA’s Model Parametric Space 
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Figure 3 Transition Matrices for Patent Race
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Figure 3a: Empirical Transition
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Figure 3b: EWA Lite
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Figure 3c: Parametric EWA
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Figure 3d: Belief-based
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Figure 3e: Choice Reinforcement with PV
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Figure 3f: Quantal Response Equilibrium
Figure 4: Empirical Frequency and Model Predictions for Continental Divide
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Figure 4a: Empirical Frequency
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Figure 4b: EWA Lite
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Figure 4c: Parametric EWA 
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Figure 4d: Belief-based
1
3
5
7
9 1
1 1
3 1
5
S1
S4
S7
S10
S13 0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
Prob
PeriodStrategy
Figure 4e: Choice Reinforcement with PV 
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Figure 4f: Quantal Response Equilibrium 
Figure 5: Empirical Frequency and Model Predictions for Traveller's Dilemma
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Figure 5a: Empirical Frequency
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Figure 5b: EWA Lite
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Figure 5c: Parametric EWA
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Figure 5d: Belief-based
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Figure 5e: Choice Reinforcement with PV 
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Figure 5f: Quantal Response Equilibrium 
